fix: add bounds check before memcpy in sdr_nav.c#80
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Automated security fix generated by OrbisAI Security
The code uses a 'type' variable derived from navigation message content to compute a destination offset for memcpy
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Summary
Fix high severity security issue in
src/sdr_nav.c.Vulnerability
V-003src/sdr_nav.c:1194Description: The code uses a 'type' variable derived from navigation message content to compute a destination offset for memcpy. The expression '16 * type' is used as an offset into ch->nav->data without bounds checking. An attacker-controlled 'type' value creates an arbitrary write primitive relative to the heap buffer, which is the most dangerous class of memory corruption vulnerability.
Evidence
Exploitation scenario: An attacker who can inject crafted GNSS navigation messages (via RF spoofing or malicious IF data file) sets the message type field to an out-of-range value.
Scanner confirmation: multi_agent_ai rule
V-003flagged this pattern.Production code: This file is in the production codebase, not test-only code.
Changes
src/sdr_nav.cVerification
Security Invariant
Regression test
This test guards against regressions — it's useful independent of the code change above.
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security